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Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200070002-9

May 30, 1957

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Secretary of State**

**SUBJECT : Disarmament Proposals: Intelligence Advantages  
of a General Exchange of "Blueprints"**

1. From the point of view of my responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence, I would like to set forth the reasons why I believe it is to the United States' advantage to broaden the exchange of "blueprints of military forces and armaments" beyond the limited Arctic-Siberian areas we now propose to include under inspection. One of the elements of the strength of the Communist world lies in their posture of secrecy. Any significant penetration of this secrecy will have substantial advantages to the Free World.

2. It is unlikely that, with certain minor exceptions and on a temporary basis, the Soviet would locate significant elements of their military forces and armaments within the limited Arctic-Siberian areas mentioned above. What we would gain, or the Soviet would lose, from such blueprints would be nominal.

3. An exchange of blueprints would not appear to be administratively unmanageable provided it is confined to a restricted number of designated items of real strategic importance. The selection of these would be a matter for the Department of Defense, but I have in mind such elements as modern jet bombers and fighters, naval vessels, major weapons such as heavy artillery, larger tanks, rockets and missiles, air bases with runways over 6,000 feet, possibly major factories producing military items, etc. If we concentrated on the major weapons and installations for which mass concealment is most difficult we would have at least made a start in the right direction.

4. The comparable data to be furnished the Soviet on U.S. forces and armaments would, I believe, merely confirm officially to them the data which is furnished in Congressional hearings and to the press.

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5. On the other hand the value of the blueprint we receive from the Soviets would be of some intelligence value even before it was capable of on-the-spot verification. Moreover, we believe that the present state of our intelligence on such key items as heavy bombers and submarines, for example, is sufficiently precise so that we could probably detect any seriously fraudulent figures. It is also highly probable that the Soviets do not know the respective degrees of certainty of our estimates on the various components of military forces and so would have a most difficult time if they attempted to fake their report in any major way.

6. Finally, if the Soviet propose to proceed to further steps of disarmament after the initial stage it would be extremely dangerous for them to start out in the first stage with fraudulent blueprints in areas where we already have considerable knowledge.

7. The original proposal regarding blueprints was eliminated when the 15% formula for international storage was changed to a provision for such storage of specifically designated items without regard to any percentage of existing blueprinted stockpiles. It seems to me, however, that entirely apart from this provision a modified formula for blueprint exchanges would present the Soviet with more problems than the United States, would give us relatively greater advantages and hence that the decision to eliminate this exchange, except for the general Arctic area, should be given further consideration before the final instructions are transmitted to London.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

cc: Secretary Quarles  
General Cutler (#2)  
Mr. Robert Bowie (#3)  
(#4)

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Copy #7 - ER ✓

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State

SUBJECT : Intelligence Advantages of a General  
Exchange of "Blueprints"

1. From the point of view of my responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence I would like to set forth the reasons why I believe it is to the United States' advantage to broaden the exchange of "blueprints of military forces and armaments" beyond the limited Arctic-Siberian areas we now propose to include under inspection.
2. A principal strength of the communist world stems from the USSR's posture of secrecy. Any significant penetration of their secrecy will have substantial, real and <sup>psychological</sup> actual advantages to the free world.
3. There is no reason to regard such an exchange as administratively unmanageable provided it is confined to items of real strategic importance. ~~Though the selection of these would be a matter for the Department of Defense, I set forth on an attached sheet an illustration of what I have in mind.~~
4. The comparable data to be furnished the Soviet on U.S. forces and armaments would merely confirm officially to them the data they must be almost certain is correct which we furnish in Congressional hearings and the public press.
5. On the other hand the value of the blueprint we receive from the Soviets would be of very great intelligence utility even before it was capable of on-the-spot verification. ~~It would be no less valuable, for example, than if a high-level defector came over to us from the Soviet Ministry of Defense and turned over to us a similar outline of their military establishments. We would obviously regard such as an uniquely valuable intelligence coup though we could not be absolutely sure of the defector's bona fides and accuracy. Moreover, the present state of our intelligence~~

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proposal  
during*

on such key items as heavy bombers and submarines is sufficiently precise so that we could be ~~virtually certain of detecting~~ any fraudulent figures on such items in the blueprint. It is also highly probable that the Soviets do not know the respective degrees of certainty of our estimates of the various components of military forces and so would have a most difficult time if they attempted to fake ~~certain portions of their report.~~

6. If the blueprint is confined to the remote Arctic regions, it will contain extremely low percentages of major armaments in which we are interested. For example, there are no permanent bases for heavy and medium bombers in the area and only a few for light bombers. Approximately one-fourth of the submarines are now based in the Kola Peninsula and Kamchatka but these could with relatively little difficulty be shifted to bases outside on the effective date of the inventory.

7. By far the most important argument in favor of the blueprint proposal is the provision that nine months after the exchange of blueprints, "mobile inspection teams would have access to objects of control in all areas of the signator states". Thus any unreliability is limited to a mere nine months during which we are certainly no worse off than we are today. From that time on our position insofar as precision of knowledge of the Soviet capability and our security against major surprise attacks would be vastly enhanced. In addition, in my opinion, there would be very great intangible advantages in that the fundamental Soviet policy of keeping foreigners away from all vital and sensitive installations and their people isolated from contact with foreigners would have been reversed and once reversed would be very difficult to reinstitute. The impact of this on their authoritarian system would be considerable and cumulative, and the basic policy objective of the United States to promote revolutionary change in the Soviet system would be notably advanced.

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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Items for Inclusion in "Blue Print"

Air Force and Naval Air

Units (USSR)	Regiment	(US) Wing
Bombers	All	
Fighters	All jets less than 5 years old	
Airbases	With runways over 6000'	

Navy

All submarines  
All surface vessels in excess of 1500 tons

Army

Units-	Divisions and larger by location and type, including regimental combat teams where separate.
Weapons	Artillery pieces greater than 100 mm caliber Tanks 20 tons and larger Rockets or missiles of range greater than 20 miles.

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